The following was originally posted 11/1/2008 on etcn.typepad.com and may refer to OpenBEDM under the project name Pygar.
Recently, I attended a lecture by Simon A. Levin (Princeton U.) on Cooperation and Collective Behavior, from Bacteria to the Global Commons. I wandered into the talk expecting to hear confirmation of themes familiar to me from the pioneering work of R. Axelrod in his 1984 book The Evolution of Cooperation (hereafter EC1984). Certainly Levin said nothing that contradicted the principles uncovered by Axelrod. Indeed, much of the totally new work is foreshadowed by Axelrod’s discussion of the potlatch tradition. But, to be blunt, EC1984 – which frames my discussion on this blog – did not set the agenda for Levin’s talk.
The game has changed; literally, it is about a different game. The research in EC1984 focused on the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma and interpreted cooperation as a way to maximize long-term economic gain. The new research focuses on games with names like Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game in which only short-term gains and losses occur. From the standpoint of EC1984, cooperation would seem unlikely to play a role in either game. Contrary to expectations however, empirical evidence shows that people exhibit “other-regarding” behavior governed by non-economic considerations. They help others without maximizing profit. The lecturer found the new empirical evidence hopeful because problems of the global commons might be solvable if the current population of citizens manifests a strong sense of altruism towards their future descendants.
I wish Dr. Levin well and hope he succeeds in encouraging environmentalism and responsible society. But, counter examples abound. Today’s headlines (Oct. 29, 2008) are occupied by news about the public funds that were given to bankers to enable them to loosen credit and benefit the general economy. Instead, the bankers are using public funds to award bonuses and finance acquisitions in order to eliminate competitors. Evidently, other-regarding behavior is not found in all social circles; indeed, Levin reminded his audience that other-regarding behavior requires an underpinning from normalizing influences like fear of punishment. Thus, the same banker who would help an acquaintance at the country club, where social reputation is important for the banker, will not help the nation because no enforceable norms apply to corporate decisions impacting the common good.
Over on the software side ( see Pygar blog), I am developing network enabled cooperation mechanisms that support the principles of EC1984. The players will operate on the Internet under conditions of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Nothing on the software side was originally conceived to enable “other-regarding” behavior in anything like the Ultimatum Game.